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Abstract 
 
In school finance lawsuits plaintiffs often claim that pay levels are not sufficient to recruit 
teachers who can deliver constitutionally-mandated levels of educational services.  In this 
paper I consider several ways in which one might bring economic theory and data to bear 
on that question. I conclude that at present, and at least for the near term, education 
research cannot prescribe an “adequate” level of school spending on teachers, whether in 
the form of pay, benefits, or professional training, that can reliability predict a target level 
of student performance.    If courts are predisposed to intervene in this matter, a more 
reasonable standard for “adequacy” is whether available revenues, when spent in an 
efficient manner, are sufficient to staff classrooms with appropriately-certified teachers in 
a flexible licensing regime that satisfies both state and federal teacher quality standards. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Teacher pay plays a major role in school finance lawsuits,   Plaintiffs typically claim that 
pay levels are not sufficient to recruit teachers who can deliver constitutionally-mandated 
levels of educational services.  For example, in the recent New York state case 
(Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York State), the plaintiffs successfully argued that 
because teacher pay schedules in New York City were well below those in the wealthier 
suburban counties such as Westchester or Nassau  it was not possible  to recruit or retain 
adequate numbers of qualified teachers.  In Massachusetts (Hancock v. Discoll)  the 
plaintiffs in the focus districts complained that that they lacked resources to pay 
competitive salaries or provide adequate professional development.   
 These school finance cases, and the more general policy debate about teacher 
quality,  have raised concern about the “adequacy” of teacher pay.   Are the resources 
provided to public schools adequate to recruit and retain a teaching workforce that can 
deliver educational services that pass constitutional muster?   In this paper I consider 
several approaches the question of teacher pay adequacy.  Each approach can in principle 
lend itself to measurement and statistical testing.  All three have appeared in the claims of 
plaintiffs in school finance cases, and in the more general policy debate about teacher 
quality.    
 The first considers the compensation of teachers vis-à-vis other professions.   If we 
found that teacher pay was substantially below that of workers in other professions with 
roughly similar levels of educational training, that would at least provide prima facie 
evidence of underpayment or inadequacy of teacher pay.   In fact, plaintiff’s experts in 
adequacy cases routinely cite data on the pay of teachers relative to other professions.  A 
second approach, which I term “regulatory compliance,”  focuses on school staffing.  
Given the per-pupil resources provided to districts, are schools able to fill vacancies with 
teachers qualified under state licensing or federal NCLB requirements?   For example, the 
high proportions of teachers with emergency or other substandard certification figured 
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prominently in California (Williams v. State), in the NYS case noted above, and was 
taken as evidence that the pay of teachers was too low.2   
 A final approach, which I would term “social underinvestment,” views teachers 
qualifications as a continuum and asks whether public schools are buying enough teacher 
quality.  In this view, teachers are “underpaid” if the social benefits from raising teacher 
pay exceed the costs, i.e., an additional dollar spent on teacher pay yields a discounted 
stream of student benefits greater than one dollar .   Thus, even if the current pay and 
benefits of teachers are adequate to staff classrooms with qualified teachers, pay may still 
be too low from a social investment point of view.    This view is often implicit in the 
arguments of those who focus on the relative pay of teachers versus non-teachers – higher 
relative pay will yield higher relative quality, and the quality response will be sufficiently 
elastic to make the investment worthwhile in cost-benefit terms.   In the sections below 
we will consider each of the views in turn.  We begin with the issue that, deceptively, 
seems most easily measured – relative teacher pay. 
 
2  Relative Teacher Pay   
 
How does the pay of teachers compare to non-teachers with similar levels of education?  
Data from the U.S. Department of Labor show that in September 2004  the average 
annual full-time earnings of public elementary school teachers in the Chicago 
metropolitan area was $47,856.  For computer systems analysts is was $72,206, or 51 
percent more.   Clearly, many factors differ between the two professions.  The training 
required is very different.  So, too, are working conditions.  Systems analysts may have 
irregular hours and be on call when there are problems.  There may be considerable 
pressure when the system is down.  Of course there are continual changes in technology 
that require constant human capital investments to keep up with the field.3  Finally, as the 
                                                 
2  To avoid verbal clutter throughout this paper, unless otherwise indicated, “teachers” refers to public 
school teachers only.  It is well known that private school teachers, particularly those in religious schools, 
have pay and benefits far below those in public schools.  Obviously, combining the two groups will lower 
average teacher pay.  However, the relevant policy debate is about public school teachers.  Note that some 
commentators on teacher pay combine public and private school teachers in their statistical analyses (e.g., 
Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel, 2004).  
3  “Computer systems analysts, database administrators, and computer scientists must be able to think 
logically and have good communication skills. Because they often deal with a number of tasks 
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“dot com meltdown” illustrates, the risk of job loss is likely much greater than for public 
elementary school teachers.  
 Ultimately, what matters from an economic point of view is the degree of 
substitution between the two professions.  Does a rise in elementary school teacher pay 
relative to system analysts lead some teachers who might have quit teaching to become 
computer system analysts, or a computer science major to switch to teaching in response 
to a relative pay change?  If this substitution elasticity is close to zero then from an 
economic point of view the earnings of computer analysts are irrelevant to a discussion of 
teacher pay.  This example may seem contrived.  The pay of computer analysts is 
probably not relevant to the career decisions of most current or would-be elementary 
school teachers.  However, it is probably much more relevant for high school computer or 
math teachers.   This example suggests that discussions of the adequacy of teacher pay 
should take teaching field into account.4   
 Studies of teacher mobility also find that teacher labor markets tend to be localized.  
Most teachers take jobs near where they grew up or went to college.5  Thus, to extend our 
example, it isn’t national earnings of computer analysts that matter, it’s the earnings of 
computer analysts in the local labor market. (particularly for the eighty percent of 
teachers who are women, most of whom are married).  
 Another problem in comparing teacher to non-teacher earnings are differences in 
annual work hours.  The standard approach in labor economics is to assess the relative 
pay of two jobs by comparing relative remuneration for an identical period of work, e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                 
simultaneously, the ability to concentrate and pay close attention to detail is important. Although these 
computer specialists sometimes work independently, they frequently work in teams on large projects. They 
must be able to communicate effectively with computer personnel, such as programmers and managers, as 
well as with users or other staff who may have no technical computer background. … Technological 
advances come so rapidly in the computer field that continuous study is necessary to keep one’s skills up to 
date.”  (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005). 
4 See Wenders (2004) for a concise discussion of teacher pay comparability. 
 
5  Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2003) for example, find that 85 percent of New York teachers take 
their first teaching job within 40 miles of their home town.  Similar high rates occur outside of NYC as 
well.  Data for Missouri show that large shares of the teaching workforce come from the nearest teacher 
training programs, which, in turn, are generally housed in four year colleges that tend to attract students 
from the same or contiguous counties.   See “Teacher Preparation Institution Profiles”  
http://dese.mo.gov/divteachqual/teached/teacherprepprof/index.html 
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hourly, weekly, or monthly.   For professions the usual metric is annual pay, which 
implicitly assumes that annual hours of work for the professions compared (e.g. doctors 
and lawyers) are similar.  The problem with comparing doctors or lawyers to k-12 
teachers is that there is a very large difference in annual hours of work on site.  Teacher 
contracts typically run 9-10 months in duration, as opposed to other professions, where 
12 month contracts are the rule.6    
 Teacher contracts are tied to the school year.  Data from the 1999-00 Schools and 
Staffing Surveys finds that the median number of days for a school year is 181.   Most 
teacher collective bargaining agreements add several additional work days for grading, 
parent teacher meetings, etc.  A representative survey 524 school districts by the 
Education Research Service finds an average contract year of 186 days for teachers 
(Education Week, April 13, 2005, p. 14). 
Over summer months, teachers are not employees of the public school system.  
 Thus, there are two ways to make an apples-to-apples comparison of teachers to non-
teachers.  One approach is to annualize teacher pay.  If we assume a 38 week contract for 
teachers, we can simply multiply annual teacher pay by 1.37 (52/38) and compare it to 
non-teachers.  Alternatively, we can compare weekly pay while under contract for 
teachers and non-teachers.  
 How does overall teacher pay compare to non-teacher pay in the local labor markets? 
Many employers, including the federal government, have need for reliable data that 
permits comparison of pay and benefits for similar jobs in the public versus private sector 
or across different metropolitan areas.  The led to the development of the National 
Compensation Survey (NCS) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the data-gathering 
arm of the U.S. Department of Labor.  The NCS is an establishment survey of employee 
salaries, wages, and benefits. It is designed to produce reliable earnings and benefit 
estimates at local levels, within broad regions, and nationwide 
(http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ocs/comfaq.htm).   One attractive feature of the NCS is that it 
                                                 
6 Scheduled hours of work on site are also much shorter for teachers as well.  For example, NCS data for 
elementary school teachers in the New York metropolitan area average 34.7 hours per week.  The similar 
figure for physicians and lawyers  is 45.4 and 37.4 hours per week, respectively  
(http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ocs/sp/ncbl0668.pdf). 
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provides data on earnings by occupation in dozens of metropolitan areas (MSA’s).   This 
is important because teacher labor markets tend to be local, not regional or national.   
 These NCS data are available for dozens of MSA’s.  However, in our examination 
we limit our analysis to the fifteen largest MSA’s.  These MSA’s accounted for roughly 
one-third of the U.S. population in 2003, thus we may assume that they represent roughly 
one third of the public school teachers as well.  For this comparison, our selection was 
guided by occupations for which college degrees (but generally not post-graduate 
degrees) are common or required, and for which data are available for many of the 
MSA’s.  We do not claim that these occupations represent the relevant non-teaching 
earnings for teachers in all fields.   However, they probably are relevant for some.  More 
likely they  pick up the general wage structure in the area labor market.  
 Data for Registered Nurses are presented in Figure 1.  RN’s are a convenient 
comparison group.  First, their mean earnings are reported in almost all labor markets in 
the NCS.  Second, like teaching, it is a female-dominated profession.   That said, I am 
aware of no study finding a high elasticity of substitution between the two occupations.   
We report two histograms per MSA.  The first gives the percent gap in annual earnings 
and the second the gap in weekly earnings.  A bar below the line indicates that teacher 
pay is below non-teacher pay, and vice-versa.7   For RN’s annual pay is below teachers in 
10 of 13 MSA’s.  However, for weekly pay the results are completely reversed:  teacher 
pay is as high as or higher than RN’s in 12 of 13 MSA’s.   In fact, in two of the MSA’s 
the weekly pay premium for teachers exceeds 40 percent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7  For public school teachers the NCS reports pay for elementary and secondary teachers separately in many 
MSA’s.  In Figures 1 and 2 we report values for elementary teachers.  Since elementary and secondary 
teachers are paid off the same salary schedules in public school districts their average salaries are very 
similar in the NCS surveys.  
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Figure 1 
 
Teacher Pay Relative to Registered Nurses: Annual and Weekly Earnings Gap for 
Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas (zero = parity) 
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Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey.  Public elementary school teachers 
versus RN’s in the indicated MSA’s.  
 
 Figure 2 reports similar ratios for six other occupations as well as RN’s.  Rather than 
report all MSA’s as in Figure 2, we simply report a population-weighted average over all 
the MSA’s for which data are available.  The number of MSA’s are indicated on top of 
the histograms.  We have chosen for comparison a variety of occupations for which BA’s 
are required or commonplace.  As in Figure 2, the first bar indicates the percentage 
teacher-non-teacher gap in annual earnings and the second in weekly earnings.  We have 
ranked the occupations from most to least favorable vis-à-vis teaching.   Starting at the 
left, teachers have a huge premium in comparison to Clinical Lab Technicians and Social 
Workers.  They have virtual parity in annual earnings but a 20 percent premium in 
weekly earnings with respect to librarians.  Their annual pay is roughly 10 percent below 
computer programmers, but on a weekly basis is twenty percent above.  Pay is less 
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favorable overall for Architects and Engineers and Managers and Administrators, 
however, for the former weekly pay is very similar.  In sum, NCS data suggest that on a 
weekly basis, teacher pay is quite competitive with many other professions.  
Figure 2 
 
Weighted Average Percent Pay Gap in Largest U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas:   
Teacher Pay Versus Selected Occupations 
(15 Largest MSA’s) 
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Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey.   Data not available for all MSA’s.  
Number of MSA’s indicated above each bar. 
 
 Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel (2004) argue that the NCS data presented above 
overstate teacher weekly and hourly pay relative to non-teachers.  They make the 
following argument.  (I am rounding weeks for simplicity.)  Non-teachers work under 52 
week contracts.  In computing weekly pay, the BLS simply divides annual earnings by 52 
weeks.  For teachers, the BLS divides by 38 weeks.  However, if non-teachers have, say, 
4 weeks of paid vacation, then Allegretto, et. al claim that this comparison is a biased 
measure of pay for weeks worked.  In my simple example above, non-teachers’ weekly 
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earnings are under-estimated by eight percent (i.e., 4 / 48 weeks).  If teachers actually 
worked every day during their 38 week contracts then this critique would be valid.  In 
fact, even under 38 week contracts, teachers have a good deal of paid leave.8  Table 1 
below reports the percent of total compensation represented by paid leave for public 
school teachers, managers and professionals in private industry, and all private sector 
workers in June 2004.  Paid leave, including vacations, amounted to 7.9 percent of total 
compensation costs for managers and professionals in the private sector as compared to 
5.1 percent for public school teachers.  Thus, in the example above, if we want to 
compute a measure of pay per week actually worked (versus weeks under contract), in 
our example we could multiply 52 x (1-.079) for managers and professionals and 38 x (1-
.051) for public school teachers.  This calculation suggests that a “weeks worked” 
comparison would result in roughly a 4 percent upward adjustment in relative weekly pay 
for non-teachers.   While not trivial, this adjustment is much smaller than is suggested by 
Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel (2004) and in no way changes our conclusions based on 
visual inspection of Figure 2.    
                                                 
8 Teacher collective bargaining agreements typically provide 10-15 days of sick or personal leave days 
during the 185-190 day contract. These days can be taken not only for illness by the teacher but also for 
family members (often broadly defined).  For example a recent Columbus, Ohio teacher contract provided 
15 sick days annually and allows teachers to use them for illness not only for themselves but for 
“immediate family” defined as:  “…  father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, wife, husband, 
grandmother, grandfather, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, legal guardian, or foster 
or step-parents of said teacher; and all dependents as defined by IRS living in the home or any person living 
in the home to whom a teacher becomes the primary caregiver.”  
http://www.ceaohio.org/contract/20032004contract.htm 
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Table 1 
 
Paid Leave for Public School Teachers and Private Sector Workers as a Percent of Total 
Compensation:  June 2004 
 
 
 Paid Leave as a 
Percent of Total 
Compensation 
Public School 
Teachers 
5.1 % 
Management, 
Professional and 
Related, Private 
Industry 
7.9 % 
All Private Industry 6.0 % 
 
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – June 2004. (Sept. 15, 
2005) Tables 4 and 5.  www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/home.htm 
  
 Most economists would probably agree with the proposition that employer-reported 
data on employee pay and benefits are much more reliable than household survey data.  
However, the household survey data do have the virtue that they permit the researcher to 
control for individual worker demographics in making pay comparisons.  For that reason, 
I also examined household survey data from the March CPS. In the March CPS 
household respondents (not necessarily the workers themselves) answer a series of 
questions about employment and earnings during the previous year.  Using the March 
2003 CPS I compared the full time earnings of public school teachers with those of other 
full time employees.   Table 2 reports the regression-adjusted gaps in the log of annual 
earning between teachers and non-teachers. 
 11
Table 2 
 
Difference in Log of Annual  Earning Earnings: Teachers Versus Other College 
Graduates, March, 2003 Current Population Surveya (t-values in parenthesis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a.  Sample:  college graduates, 18-64, who worked full-time at least 36 weeks in 2002 with non-imputed 
earnings on longest job.  Dependent variable equals total annual earnings. 
b.  Covariates include Quartic in Age, education dummies (MA, Ph.D/Ed.D), race/ethnicity, married, metro 
residence 
 
 The March CPS results reinforce our findings with the NCS.  If teachers and non-
teachers had identical weekly earnings but 38 and 52 week contracts, respectively, then in 
an annual earnings regression teachers the gap in the natural log of earnings would be -
.314 ( = ln (38/52)).  indicating a  27 percent pay gap (38/52 – 1).  The estimates in the 
first column have no covariates, and I progressively add covariates plus regional and state 
dummies.  I believe the estimates in column three, which absorb a state effect along with 
controls for rural and urban residence, provide the most accurate estimate of the annual 
earnings gap. The log gap in earnings for women is quite small,  on the order of .04.  For 
 Total Earnings 
Females OLS OLS OLS M-REG 
 -.048* -.039* -.026 -.053** 
 (2.31) (1.97) (1.33) (3.31) 
Covariatesb N Y Y Y 
Regions (4) N Y N Y 
States 
(50+DC) 
N N Y N 
N 8134 8134 8134 8134 
     
Males     
 -.343** -.304** -.281** -.305** 
 (10.14) (9.63) (14.88) (10.04) 
Covariatesb N Y Y Y 
Regions (4) N Y N Y 
States 
(50+DC) 
N N Y N 
N 10437 10437 10437 10437 
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males it on the order of -.3.  Thus, the March earnings regressions suggest that on a 
weekly basis, on average female teachers earn more than non-teachers.9   
 This finding  is consistent with the those of a careful study of 2000 Census Public 
Use data.  Taylor (2005) analyzed a very large national sample of workers from the 5 
percent Individual Public Use Microdata Sample from the 2000 Census of Population.  
Taylor finds that college-educated non-teachers are much less likely to live in rural areas 
than are teachers.  Since earnings for all occupations tend to be lower in rural areas, 
failing to take account of the spatial distribution of teachers will tend to greatly understate 
their earnings vis-à-vis other college educated workers.  She estimates a complicated 
multivariate statistical model with 469 occupation and 800 labor market variables, along 
with the usual education, demographic, and self-reported weekly and annual work time.  
Taylor finds that teachers earned eight percent less than college-educated non-teachers.  
When she restricts her comparison to a set of occupations more comparable to teachers 
the gap drops to just six percent.  Since she is replicating the work of Allegreto, 
Corcoran, and Mishel (2004) she combines both public and private school teachers in her 
estimates.  If we assume that private school teachers on average earn 70 percent of public 
school pay, then her estimates suggest that the (self-reported) hours adjusted gap in 
earnings between teachers and college-educated non-teachers is only 4-6 percent.  Thus, 
these estimates suggest than when one takes account of the shorter annual hours, public 
school teachers and non-teachers have approximate  parity in earnings. 
 
The Shadow Price of Summers Off 
 
While weekly earnings of teachers under contract may compare favorably with those in 
some other professions, it may be the case that individuals who choose non-teaching 
occupations prefer more weeks of paid work than teaching provides.  For such 
individuals, annual rather than weekly earnings are the more relevant measure of 
remuneration.  In fact, the vast majority of public school teachers do not work in the 
summer and there has been no tendency for that to change of the last decade or so.   In 
1987-88 Schools and Staffing Surveys (SASS), 32.5 percent of teachers reported working 
                                                 
9  The estimates in Table 2 would also include summer earnings for teachers.  Thus teachers may be 
working more than 38 weeks.  
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for pay during the summer.  In 1999-00 SASS (the most recent available) the percentage 
was virtually identical (34.5 percent).  Unfortunately, these SASS data provide no 
information on the number of days worked by teachers during the summer, only whether 
they worked and total summer earnings.  Of the 34.5 percent who worked, all we know is 
that their average earnings were roughly $3500.   However, we do not know if they 
earned this in two days or twenty days. 
 Clearly teaching will tend to attract individuals who value short and predictable 
hours of work on site and long summer vacations, i.e., women with children, or who plan 
to have children.  Data from the 1990 Census of Population show that the average 
number of own children for college-educated women aged 40 and younger employed in 
teaching was considerably higher than for other occupations (2.1 versus 1.7). The share 
of women in teaching is high and rising.  From 1960 through the mid 1980’s, women 
accounted for roughly 68-69 percent of public school teachers.  However, between the 
mid-80’s to 2001, the most recent national data available, the female share has increased 
to 79 percent (U.S. Department of Labor, Table 69).   Clearly, the modest gaps in annual 
pay estimated in the previously section for females would be easily offset by savings in 
daycare over the summer and during the work year. This type of benefit will on average 
be of less value to males, many of whom would desire more hours of work.  Not 
surprisingly, far more males than females move into administrative k-12 positions.   This 
suggests if the goal is to increase the number of male teachers, teacher pay may need to 
increase.10  
 
Earnings of Exiting Teachers 
 
If public school teachers are “underpaid” then we would expect to observe earnings for 
teachers who quit teaching and move to non-teaching jobs to jump sharply.  Podgursky, 
Monroe, and Watson (2004)  analyzed  new teachers who terminated initial teaching 
spells between 1990-91 and 1999-2000 and who did not subsequently return to public 
school teaching.  They then matched these records against the Missouri master 
                                                 
10  Or licensing entry barriers will need to be changed.  Many states have enacted alternative certification or 
alternative route programs to recruit career changers or post-baccalaureate candidates to enter teaching in a 
way that minimizes pre-service training.  The population of teachers who enter through such programs tend 
to include relatively more men as well as minorities. Podgursky (2003). 
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Unemployment Insurance earnings files for the four quarters of the calendar year 
following their last year of teaching and compared these post-teaching earnings to the 
earnings they would have made had they stayed in their school district (using district 
salary schedule data).  The results are presented in Table 3 below. For males, non-
teaching earnings are slightly lower than teaching earnings and only about 45 percent of 
male teachers earned more than their teaching earnings.  In part this may due to greater 
prevalence of part time employment in non-teaching earnings.  (UI data did not permit 
them to distinguish between hours and earnings.)  For women, however, non-teaching 
earnings are well below teaching earnings.  These findings mirror those in Stinebrickner, 
Scafini, and Sjodquist (2002) who conducted a similar study using Georgia UI earnings 
data, and Wyoming (Wolkoff and Podgursky, 2002).11 
                                                 
11 Data from the NCES 2000-01 Teacher Follow-up Survey are consistent with these findings.  They find 
that only 19 percent of teachers who were in classrooms in 1999-00 and who quit teaching the subsequent 
year reported “better salary or benefits” as very important or extremely important in their decision to leave 
teaching (U.S. Department of Education, 2004, Table 7).   
 15
Table 3 
 
Teaching and Non-teaching Earnings of Teachers Who Quit Teaching Between 1992-
2000 Who Were Reemployed in a UI-Covered Missouri Job 
 
 
Source:  Podgursky, Monroe, Watson (2004, Table 6) 
 
a. Earnings of the teacher based on former salary and estimated returns to experience from the salary 
schedule of the district in which they were employed. 
 
b.  Sum of earnings in four quarters of the calendar year following year of exit starting in the forth quarter 
for teachers with positive earnings in at least one quarter, e.g., for teachers who quit teaching in the 1999-
2000 school year this would be the total of earnings in 2000:4 through 2001:3. 
ACT Score 
Total Number 
of Teachers 
Estimated  
Teaching  
Earningsa 
UI Earnings after 
Leaving Teachingb
Ratio  
Non-Teaching 
to Teaching 
Earnings 
Percent of 
Exiting Teachers 
Found in UI file 
Percent of Exiting 
Teachers with UI 
Earnings Greater 
than Simulated 
Teaching Earnings
 Males       
19 and 222 $25,716  $25,550  .99 64% 43% 
below         
20-21 299 $25,287  $26,759  .99 70% 37% 
22-24 316 $25,001  $24,702  .99 64% 45% 
25-26 164 $24,742  $24,087  .97 67% 44% 
27 and 209 $25,138  $23,471  .93 63% 44% 
above         
All 1,210 $25,192  $25,109  1.00 66% 43% 
Females       
19 and 845 $24,811  $19,512  .78 57% 27% 
below          
20-21 1,055 $24,466  $17,703  .72 58% 22% 
22-24 1,071 $24,923  $18,505  .74 55% 27% 
25-26 460 $24,498  $18,145  .74 57% 28% 
27 and 532 $25,241  $15,750  .62 53% 17% 
above            
All 3,963 $24,773  $18,109  .73 56% 25% 
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Fringe Benefits 
 
Anecdotal data suggest that the fringe benefits of public school teachers compare 
favorably to those in the private sector.  However, systematic data on this point has only 
recently become available.  One valuable feature of the NCS is that it also provides data 
on the costs of employee benefits and detailed data on the character of fringe benefits for 
public and private employees.  Unfortunately, due to concerns about inadequate sample 
size the BLS until recently did not disaggregate fringe benefit costs for public school 
teachers.12  Public school teachers were grouped with college professors as well as pre-
school teachers.  However, more recent reports have begun to present some limited data 
broken out for public school teachers.  Table 4 presents data from the most recent BLS 
report.  Here we report selected fringe benefits as a percent of total compensation.  
Insurance (primarily health insurance) and retirement contributions are a substantially 
larger percent of total compensation for teachers as compared to professional employees 
in private sector employment.  However, most teachers are not covered by the federal 
social security system, so legally required contributions are somewhat smaller for 
teachers.  Overall, these three components of benefits total 20.2 percent of payroll for 
teachers, and 17.0 percent for private sector managers and professionals.  Thus, fringe 
benefits are at least comparable to those of professionals in the private sector.  
                                                 
12 Because of sample size restrictions, the BLS still does not disaggregate data on employee benefits for 
public k-12 school teachers (e.g., U.S. Department of Labor. 2000)  Tabulations for “teachers” in this 
report include college professors as well as pre-school teachers. 
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Table 4 
 
Selected Fringe Benefit Costs: Public School Teachers Versus Private Sector 
Professionals 
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  “Employer Costs for Employee Benefits – 
June 2004.”  (Sept. 15, 2004), Tables 4 and 5.   www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/home.htm 
 
Why Spending Per Student Rises Faster Than Teacher Pay 
 
Any discussion of teacher pay needs to be combined with a discussion of staffing.   If 
revenues available for payroll rise by 5 percent, school districts have a tradeoff.  They 
can hold staffing ratios constant and raise pay by five percent, freeze pay and lower 
staffing ratios by five percent, or some combination of the two that totals five percent.  
Over the last two decades, public schools have absorbed professional and non-
professional staff at rates well in excess of student enrollment growth. Figure 3 shows 
that since 1980 public school enrollment has grown by 17 percent while teacher 
employment has grown by 37 percent.  By fall 2002, the overall student-teacher ratio had 
fallen from 18.7 in 1980 to 16.1.   These statistics only count teachers.  If we include 
teacher aids, librarians, counselors, and other instructional staff  the student teacher ratio 
falls to 12. .  If we count all adults on the payroll (e.g., secretaries, custodians) the ratio 
drops to 8.1.  Again, it would be possible to raise the pay of teachers if other staff were 
trimmed.  In fact, the non-teaching staff have grown slightly faster than the teaching staff 
since 1980.  Simply put, any school district could raise teacher pay with current revenues 
 Insurance Retirement and  
Savings 
Legally  
Required 
(Social 
Security,  
Worker’s 
comp., 
UI ) 
Total 
Public School 
Teachers 
9.1% 5.9% 5.2% 20.2% 
Management, 
Professional, 
and Related  
(Private) 
6.0% 3.8% 7.2% 17.0% 
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by increasing the student-teacher ratio or by lowering the ratio of non-teaching to 
teaching staff. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Public School Enrollment and Teacher Employment:  Fall 1980 -  Fall 2002  
(1980 = 100.0) 
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Source:  National Center for Education Statistics.  Digest of Education Statistics 2003.
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 It is sometimes argued that this staffing growth is driven by special education 
spending. Figure 4 presents Missouri data suggesting that this is not the case.   Missouri’s 
student teacher ratio in 2002-2003 (13.9) was below the national average,  and, like the 
overall national rate, has declined substantially over the last two decades.  Using 
administrative state data, we can establish how much of this decline is due to 
employment of special education teachers.  The  lower line presents the actual student-
teacher ratio and the upper line presents the student teacher ratio holding the special ed 
share of teachers constant at the 1990 rate (12.9 percent).13  The additional growth of 
special education teachers lowered the student teacher ratio by .4 students and accounted 
for 19.6 percent of the decline.  Thus just over 80 percent of the decline was due to other 
factors.  Similarly, while some of the growth in non-teacher staffing (e.g., teacher aids) 
might be associated with special education, most cannot (e.g., counselors, media 
specialists, administrators).   
(Figure 4) 
 In sum, when adjusted for annual hours of work, the pay of teachers is not obviously 
out of line with that of other college educated workers.  Indeed, when expressed on a 
weekly basis, teacher pay compare favorably to many other professions in metropolitan 
labor markets.  Teacher benefits compare quite favorably as well.  By allowing 
professional and non-professional employment to far outstrip enrollment growth, school 
districts have passed up opportunities to make teacher pay even more competitive. 
  
2  Regulatory Compliance 
 
A second approach to the question of adequacy is to determine whether schools have 
resources sufficient to put qualified teachers in the classroom.  Clearly this criterion is 
related to the previous one.  Presumably districts with higher relative pay will have lower 
turnover and thus fewer vacancies.  They will also have larger applicant pools and thus 
more qualified applicants per vacancy.  However, there is no reason to believe that the 
level of pay necessary to staff classrooms with qualified teachers will produce earnings 
                                                 
13  A special education teacher is defined as any teacher who teaches at least one special education class 
during the day.  None of these results change if other definitions are used. 
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“parity,” however defined, with other professions.  It may be that the level of pay 
adequate to staff elementary school classrooms, for example,  is just sixty percent that of 
accountants.  Moreover these benchmarks are likely to vary by teaching field and from 
one geographic labor market to another. 
 An issue that arises here is the definition of “qualified.”  Since public school teacher 
labor markets are highly regulated, satisfying the quality standards of state and federal  
regulations would seem to be a logical starting point.  Teachers in all states must hold 
state licenses to teach in public school classrooms and in nearly all states this requires 
completion of a state-approved teacher training program with supervised student 
teaching.   In addition 37 states require teachers pass a pre-professional test prior to 
entering a teacher training program, 38 require a field specific licensing exam, and 16 
require candidates to pass a performance evaluation one or two years after they have been 
on the job.  Many states require ongoing professional training or evaluation for license 
renewal (27).14     
 The federal NCLB act mandating “highly qualified” teachers in every classroom 
adds  further hoops for both new and incumbent teachers in core academic subjects.  All 
new teachers must hold at least a baccalaureate degree or higher, be fully licensed, and 
have demonstrated subject matter competence in the areas they teach.  Similarly, all 
incumbent teachers must meet a similar standard, although states are permitted to come 
up with their own methods (subject to federal approval) to demonstrate compliance.  The 
latter are called HOUSSE standards (High Objective Uniform State Standard of 
Evaluation).   
 How well, then, are school districts able to meet these regulatory standards?    I am 
aware of no nation-wide data.  In part this is due to that fact that licensing and HOUSSE 
standards vary from state-to-state.  The most commonly used national data file, the 
Schools and Staffing Surveys, includes a teacher survey wherein roughly 42,000 public 
school teachers are asked about their educational backgrounds and teaching credentials.  
Tabulations from the most recent available survey (1999-00) finds that 90 percent of 
public school teachers report that they hold regular state certification in their primary 
                                                 
14  Education Week (2005, pp. 92-93),  NASDTEC (2003). 
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teaching area.  Administrative data from states or school district report cards tend to 
reinforce this finding.  I am aware of no systematic compilation of these data, however, a 
simple perusal of state and district report cards finds similar figures.   
 California certainly represents one of the most highly stressed public systems in the 
nation.  The school age population is growing rapidly.  The state has major fiscal 
difficulties.  Less well known is the fact that in 1996 voters in a state-wide ballot passed a 
class size reduction initiative that greatly exacerbated teacher shortages and led to an 
exodus of teachers from many urban classrooms as suburban jobs opened up (Jenson and 
Rivkin, 2002).   In spite of these travails, in school year 2003-04, 89.4 percent of 
California public school teachers hold full (“clear”) teaching credentials in their teaching 
area.  Another 5.3 percent are in supervised intern or pre-intern programs.  Only 5.2 
percent are teaching with substandard credentials (emergency or waiver).   
 Data reported for Illinois provide a more detailed portrait in that state (Table 5). 
Ninety eight percent of teachers state-wide hold regular certification, a figure that varies 
little between high and low poverty districts.  The last column provides a more interesting 
statistic.  This is the percent of core academic teachers who are “highly qualified” by 
NCLB standards – 98.2 percent statewide, and 93.4 percent in high poverty districts.   
 
Table 5 
Teachers Certification Rates: Illinois Public Schools, 2003-04 
 
% of Teachers with 
Regular Certification 
% of Classes Taught by 
Highly Qualified 
Teacher 
All Districts 98.3 98.2 
High Poverty 95.4 93.4 
Low Poverty  99.5 99.7 
 
Source:  Illlinois Board of Education.  2004 State Report Card  
http://www.isbe.net/research/pdfs/2004_StateReport_E.pdf 
 
 While the overall compliance rates are very high, detailed examination of district 
data show that virtually no school district is in full compliance with licensing laws.  
Figure 5 presents data for Missouri public K-12 school districts (I have excluded k-8 
districts).  On the vertical axis we measure the percent of courses taught by teachers with 
inappropriate licenses during the 2002-2003 school year.  Arguably this type of statistic, 
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which is not available in most states, is a better measure of student exposure to teachers 
with substandard certification.   On the horizontal axis we measure spending per student 
in average daily attendance.  Of 447 K-12 school districts only two had no courses taught 
by an inappropriately licensed teacher (the average was 9.5 percent). Moreover, the 
prevalence of inappropriate licensed practice seems to have little to do with per pupil 
district spending.  In fact, the correlation between the rate of unlicensed teaching and 
spending per student is positive and statistically significant (.27).   
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Figure 5 
Percent of Courses Taught by Teachers With Inappropriate or No Licenses by 
Expenditure Per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance: Missouri K-12 Public School 
Districts, 2001-2002 
 
 
Source:  Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. 
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  Figure 6 presents similar data for New York State.15  In this case, NYS publishes 
data on the percent of teachers who teach at least 20 percent of their classes with no or an 
inappropriate teaching license.  Again, virtually no district is in total compliance, and 
higher spending districts are as likely to be out of compliance as low spending districts.  
A case in point is Scarsdale, which boasted a 2002-03 median teacher salary of  $95,326, 
but nonetheless had 4.8 percent of its teachers out of compliance as defined above. 
 
Figure 6 
 
Percent of Teachers Not Certified and Instructional Spending per Pupil:  
New York State 
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Source:  New York State Department of Education.  All school districts with at least 500 students.  New 
York City did not provide data in this report.  Percent uncertified teachers for 2002-03, spending per pupil 
2001-02. 
http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/655report/2004/home.html 
 
                                                 
15  New York has 703 regular school districts.  Figure 6 presents data for school districts with at least 200 
students.  
 
r = .04
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 Why are nearly all school districts to some degree out of compliance with these 
certification laws and why is non-compliance unrelated to spending?  I would argue that 
that given the Byzantine complexity of state teacher licensing laws, bureaucratic delay, 
and the natural dynamics of the teacher labor market, full compliance is nearly 
impossible (or random). In fact, teacher labor markets likely have a “natural rate of non-
compliance” that is above zero for many of the same reasons that the macroeconomy has 
a  “natural rate of unemployment” that is above zero.  
 Consider Missouri.  Like all other states with which I am familiar, the state of 
Missouri issues a single license to practice medicine, law, dentistry, accounting, nursing, 
and veterinary medicine.  However, in the area of K-12 education the Missouri 
Department of Elementary and Secondary education currently issues 260 certificates and 
endorsements (171 vocational, 89 non-vocational).  However, that is only part of the 
story.  There are levels of certification (permanent, provisional) for all of these and a host 
of “grandmothered” codes.  As a consequence, there are 781 valid certification codes in 
the master teacher certification file.  There is nothing unique about Missouri.   
 Now combine this complex licensing regime with the dynamics of the teacher labor 
market and the result is less than complete compliance even under the best of conditions.  
At the district level, roughly 10-12 percent of teaching positions turn over each year.  
Many of these exits are temporary (“stopouts”) for child-rearing or other family matters.   
Roughly one third of district level turnover is inter-district mobility of teachers.  As a 
consequence roughly 80 percent of teaching vacancies at the district level are filled by 
experienced teachers (U.S. Department of Education, 2000).  However, given this labor 
market flux, school administrators find themselves scrambling under short deadlines to 
fill classrooms with qualified teachers.  It is inevitable that some classrooms will be filed 
with teachers whose certificate papers are not in order.  Perhaps their license has expired 
and new approval is pending.  Perhaps the elementary teacher in Missouri taught in 
Florida with a valid license but falls short of some requirements for a regular Missouri 
certificate.  A science position may be held by a new liberal arts college graduate who 
lacks only  one or two education school courses for certification. A chemistry teacher in 
rural high school may need to cover biology  and math courses as well.  Or maybe the 
state regulators have simply misplaced a teacher’s certification paperwork.  For these and 
 26
a myriad of other reasons, these complex licensing systems that states have constructed 
virtually guarantee a steady-state rate of compliance less than one hundred percent.   For 
this reason, I believe it is unrealistic for courts to hold school districts to a standard that 
requires perfect compliance for “adequacy,”  yet this seems to be the position of many 
advocates.  “A qualified teacher in every classroom” is taken to mean a fully certified 
teacher in every class, every hour of the day. 
 In short, given current levels of spending, the vast majority of public school districts 
have staffed public school classroom with teachers who meet state licensing standards 
(Wenders, 2004). Education researchers and commentators may argue about the rigor or 
efficacy of some of these standards,  and the jury is clearly out as to their long-run effect.  
However,  it is clear that many states and the federal government are groping toward 
regulatory mechanisms for raising the quality of the teaching workforce.  While this 
process is under way, courts should defer to education regulators in defining “qualified” 
rather than accepting definitions from education advocacy groups – an argument that we 
will expand upon below. 
 
The Structure of Teacher Pay 
 
A fundamental problem in assessing the adequacy of teacher pay is the fact that it is not 
market-based.  Working conditions, training, and, in particular, non-teaching 
opportunities differ greatly by teaching field and between schools.  The training and 
alternative employment opportunities for a typical second grade teacher are very different 
from those of the typical high school chemistry teacher, yet both are paid off the same 
salary schedule in nearly all school districts in the U.S.  For example, in 2004 there were 
25 applicants for every elementary school vacancy in Missouri but just five for each 
chemistry opening.   The salary schedules set teacher pay based on years of experience 
and accumulated graduate credits or degrees.  Table 6 shows the current salary schedule 
for teachers in Chicago public schools.  There are 13 seniority step rows and five 
graduate credit columns (“lanes”).   A teacher with an MA “tops out” after 13 years at a 
salary of $65,636 annually.  This does not mean no further salary increases are 
forthcoming.  However, at that point, a teacher will only receive increases reflecting the 
general increase in pay associated with a cell from one year to the next.  There is nothing 
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special about this salary schedule.  I chose it merely for illustration.  The level of pay, 
number of steps and columns will vary from district to district, however, the general 
structure of setting base pay according to seniority and graduate credits is the same in 
nearly every U.S. school district, large or small.16 
 
Table 6 
 
Chicago Public Schools: 2005-2006 Teacher Salary Schedule 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.cps-humanresources.org/Employee/Forms/SalAdm/TSCHA-01_05.pdf 
 
                                                 
16 Charter and private schools are much less likely than traditional public schools to use these types salary 
schedules.  See Podgursky and Ballou (2002) and Podgursky (2005). 
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 If pay is not market-based, what level of inefficiency in teacher salary schedules is 
tolerable in assessing whether teacher pay is adequate?   If, as is commonplace, a single 
salary schedule for a school district yields a large surplus of qualified applicants for 
elementary education, social studies, and physical education, but no qualified applicants 
in physics or speech pathology, is teacher pay in this district “adequate?”   Recent studies 
of teacher effects by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) find no effects on teacher 
performance beyond the first year of teaching experience, yet school districts routinely 
use additional revenues to “backload” pay increases by adding additional steps on a 
salary schedules or longevity bonuses at 25 or 30 years (Ballou and Podgursky; 2002; 
Lankford and Wyckoff, 1997).   By suppressing performance or field-based pay 
differentials these schedules may be driving high ability teachers out of the profession.  
Hoxby and Leigh (2004) conclude that wage compression associated with collective 
bargaining and salary schedules helped push high ability women out of teaching.  Single 
salary schedules impose identical salaries across dozens or even hundreds of schools in a 
district that often differ greatly in their attractiveness as places to work.  Experienced 
teachers often use their seniority to transfer from high poverty to low poverty schools, 
resulting in intra-district inequities in school spending (Roza and Hill, 2004).   
 The inefficient structure of teacher pay is yet another reason that the rate of 
certification is rarely one hundred percent in any district.  A typical district will have a 
large lumber of certified applicants per vacancy in fields such as elementary or physical 
education, however they may have far fewer in fields such as special education, science, 
or math.  Rather than differentiate pay to reflect market conditions, nearly all school 
districts persist in maintaining rigid salary schedules.  These virtually guarantee shortages 
or recruitment difficulties in some fields at some time, even if the overall level of 
resources for pay and benefits are more than adequate. 
 
Should Courts Push the Bar Higher?  
 
Some might argue that “highly qualified” teacher standards are not very high.  No doubt 
there is some merit in this charge.  However, if we move away from federal and state 
regulatory standards for teachers to other teacher quality measures, what standards do we 
use?   For example, in the CFE case plaintiff’s experts presented evidence purporting to 
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show that teachers in New York City were inferior to teachers in the rest of the state.  
Indicators of inferiority included multiple failures on licensing exams and lower 
selectivity of colleges attended by NYC teachers.  In other cases, plaintiffs have claimed 
that teachers lacked adequate professional development.  Or that teachers in plaintiff 
districts have fewer MA degrees.  A common feature of all such claims is an appeal to the 
courts to set the adequacy bar higher than the standards of the state regulators. 
 Such claims assume that the teacher characteristics in question – MA degrees, 
professional development, college selectivity – have a demonstrable and strong 
relationship to student achievement.   In fact, the evidence linking any type of teacher 
training, licensing, or testing to student achievement is mixed at best.  Even estimated 
effects of general academic skills of teachers such as SAT scores, while usually 
statistically significant, are generally modest in effect.  MA degrees are particularly 
suspect.  A recent survey by Hanushek (2003) finds that of 170 reported estimates, 86 
percent were statistically insignificant.  Of the statistically significant studies, nine 
percent were positive and five percent negative.  Nonetheless, interdistrict gaps in the 
share of teachers with MA or higher degrees are routinely presented as evidence of 
resource inadequacy. 
  Does this mean teachers do not matter?  On the contrary, while the effect of 
measured teacher characteristics is small, one consistent finding is that there seems to be 
considerable variation in teacher effectiveness between classrooms.  Thus, if one 
compares the effect on student learning of the top and bottom 20 percent of teachers 
ranked by performance, the effect is often quite substantial.   However, these teacher 
effects are largely unrelated to traditional measures of teacher quality such as licensing 
exam test scores, certification credentials, experience, or graduate degrees, a result 
highlighted in a survey by Goldhaber (2002).  Hanushek and Rivkin (2003), summarizing 
their own and other research come to the same conclusion.     
 A recent study of Chicago public teachers by Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2003) 
illustrates this point well.  Like other such studies, this work is based on a large 
longitudinal file of linked student achievement scores.  What makes this study unique is 
that the authors also have very extensive administrative data on teacher characteristics 
that are unavailable in other studies, including education, experience, types of teaching 
 30
licenses, and selectivity of the teacher’s undergraduate college.  They find that over 
ninety percent of teacher effects are not explained by any measured teacher 
characteristics.   
 In sum, the growing “teacher effects” literature suggests that teacher quality, as 
measured by student achievement gains, is highly idiosyncratic.  This does not mean that 
teacher quality is random or unknowable.  It simply means that traditional measures of 
teacher quality – experience, MA’s, education coursework – explain virtually none of the 
variation in teacher effectiveness.  However much courts may wish to raise student 
achievement through higher teacher quality, research to date does not provide observable 
“buttons” to push.  Indeed, if anything, the trend is in opposite direction, pointing to ever 
fewer buttons. 
 
4 Underinvestment in Teacher Quality 
 
The analysis in section II treats teacher pay as “adequate” if schools are able to staff their 
classrooms with qualified teachers, where qualified is understood to mean teachers who 
meet state licensing and NCLB requirements.  As the previous discussion indicates, this 
is a fairly simplistic approach to defining teacher quality.  Many economists would treat 
quality as a continuous variable.  In this view, higher relative pay for teachers would 
improve the quality of the applicant pool thereby allowing schools to recruit and retain 
better teachers who, in turn, would improve student achievement.  In this view, even if 
state regulators do not know what observable buttons to push, presumably local 
administrators do, and will take advantage of the larger applicant pools do pick out the 
better applicants.  
 Surveys of the early education production function literature find little evidence of a 
strong positive effect of teacher pay on student achievement.  Of 118 estimates reported 
in the literature, 73 percent were statistically insignificant, 20 percent were positive and 
significant, and 7 percent were negative and significant (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2004).  In 
a subset of studies they (appropriately) term “high quality” (student-level data, value-
added econometric model, single state), there are 17 estimates in the literature.  Of these 
82 percent were statistically insignificant and 18 percent were positive and significant.  
Two recent, sophisticated studies of teacher effects cast further doubt on a positive wage 
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effect.  Jacobs and Lefgren (2005) find no relationship between teacher pay and teacher 
performance in a large urban school district, and Hanushek, Rivkin, and O’brien (2005) 
report no relationship between teacher productivity and changes in teacher pay for 
teachers who left a Texas school district.  Earlier studies using Census data or aggregated 
district data have found positive effects on student test scores (Ferguson, 1991) or student 
graduate rates (Loeb and Page, 2000).  However, at best one could only call research 
support for a positive teacher pay effect mixed.  I see it trending negative.  Moreover, 
even in studies finding a positive effect, I have seen no evidence presented that across-
the-board pay increases are cost-efficient or pass a benefit-cost test. 
 In the absence of direct support in the  education production function literature, it is 
interesting  to assess some indirect evidence from the market for private school teachers.  
Suppose that the benefits of higher teacher pay did, in fact, outweigh the costs, and public 
schools were setting teacher pay inefficiently low.  If that were the case, one would 
expect to see private schools, which operate in a very competitive market, paying higher 
teacher pay.  After all, private school parents should be willing to pay higher tuition to 
support higher teacher pay if it is worth it in terms of their own children’s achievement.  
Many of these same parents will soon be paying college tuition rates far in excess of 
those in K-12, reflecting in part the higher faculty salaries at private colleges and 
universities. 
 Of course, in areas other than K-12 education personnel managers routinely use 
private pay and benefits as a benchmark in setting government pay.   Indeed, one 
important function of compensation data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is to 
provide private-sector as well as state and local benchmark data for Federal wage-setting.  
In higher education, administrators (and faculty) are keenly aware the level and structure 
of compensation in private institutions. 
 Since 12 percent of teachers are employed in private schools, one might expect 
private sector compensation data to play a larger role in policy discussions concerning the 
adequacy of public school teacher pay.  The two sectors compete for teachers and 
mobility between the two is extensive.  Data from the 1999-2000 School and Staffing 
Survey show that 36 percent of full-time private and 13 percent of full-time public school 
teachers report some teaching experience in the other sector. 
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 In fact, comparisons of pay and benefits between the two sectors play little role in 
discussions of public school teacher pay.  In part this may reflect the role that teacher 
unions play in shaping the policy discussion – neither the AFT nor the NEA mention 
private schools in their reports on teacher pay.  There are, however, legitimate objections 
to public-private comparisons.  First, many private schools have a religious orientation 
and are staffed by teachers of the same religious denomination.  To the extent that such 
schools are advancing a religious mission, they and their teachers are not comparable to 
public K-12 schools.  Second, private schools are generally more selective in admissions 
than public schools and, on average, have students with higher socioeconomic status.  To 
the extent this results in better-behaved and more academically-motivated  students in 
private-school classrooms, it makes for a more attractive teaching environment.   
 Table 7 presents regression estimates comparing public and private teacher salaries 
in a manner that attempts to address these concerns.  First, I present earnings data only 
for private school teachers in non-religious private schools.  In addition, I exclude private 
schools that have a special emphasis (e.g., special education, Montessori, Waldorf) and 
only focus on schools that most closely resemble traditional public schools in mission.   
The gap in log pay between teachers in private schools and public schools is .136, 
implying that private school teachers earn only 87 percent on average what public school 
teachers earn.   Even with the above adjustments, a critic might argue that private school 
teaching is not comparable to public school teaching since the socioeconomic status of 
the former students is higher.  In order to make the public schools more comparable to 
private, I exclude over 90 percent of the public school teacher sample and only retain 
public school teachers in low-poverty (less than five percent free and reduced lunch 
eligible), suburban schools.  If we restrict our attention to very low poverty suburban 
schools private school teachers earn just 79-81 percent of what public school teachers 
earn.  Not only are private school salaries lower, but the benefits are lower as well 
(Podgursky, 2003).   The fact that we observe selective private schools paying lower 
teacher salaries suggests that whatever positive effects higher teacher pay may have on 
teacher quality, they do not produce commensurate benefits in terms of student 
achievement, or at least benefits of sufficient magnitude that parents are willing pay for 
them. 
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Table 7 
 
Pay Gap Between Full-Time Teachers in Private Non-Sectarian Schools and Public 
School Teachers (t-values in parenthesis) 
 
 
 All Public  
School 
Teachers 
Public School 
Teachers in 
Low Poverty 
Suburban 
Schools 
 
Public School 
Teachers in 
Low Poverty 
Suburban 
Schools 
Public School 
Teachers in 
Low Poverty 
Suburban 
Schools 
Private-Public 
Pay Gap in 
Logs 
-.136 
(11.90) 
 
-.315 
(22.61) 
-.210 
(12.88) 
-.236 
(14.82) 
Private Teacher 
Pay as % of  
Public 
(regression 
adjusted) 
 
87.2 % 
 
73.0 % 
 
81.1 % 
 
79.0 % 
Other 
Covariates a 
No Yes Yes Yes 
State Effects No No Yes No 
MSA Effects No No No Yes 
N 39,024 2,958 2958 2958 
 
a. Central City, suburb, gender, race, education, total teaching experience, school/district teaching 
experience.  State effects model absorbs state.  MSA model absorbs the first three digits of the of the school 
zip code. 
 
Source:  1999-00 Schools and Staffing Surveys 
 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Plaintiffs in school finance “adequacy” lawsuits often claim that teacher pay levels are 
not sufficient to recruit or retain teachers of sufficient quality to deliver constitutionally-
mandated levels of educational services.  These claims, and the more general policy 
debate about teacher quality, have raised concern about the “adequacy” of teacher pay.   
In this paper I considered three notions of  “adequacy” concerning teacher remuneration. 
The first considers the relative pay of teachers.  If teacher pay were substantially below 
that of workers in other professions with roughly similar educational training,  that would 
at least provide prima facie evidence of underpayment or inadequacy of teacher pay.  In 
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fact, when adjusted for annual weeks of work, teacher pay and benefits compare 
favorably with those of other college-educated workers.   A second approach focuses on 
school staffing.  Given the per-pupil resources provided to schools, are they able to fill 
vacancies with qualified teachers?   In fact, the vast majority of public school classrooms 
are staffed by teachers who meet state licensing and federal NCLB requirements.  The 
fact that compliance is not one hundred percent is largely due to the bureaucratic 
complexity of state licensing regimes combined with the dynamics of teacher labor 
markets and seems to have little relationship district resources.  A final approach treats 
teacher qualifications as a continuum and asks whether public schools are under-
investing in teacher quality relative to other inputs.  In this view, teachers are “underpaid” 
if the social benefits from raising teacher pay exceed the costs.  At present, scientifically-
valid education research simply cannot define an “adequate” level of school spending on 
teachers, whether in the form of pay, benefits, or professional training, that can with even 
minimal levels of statistical reliability predict a target level of student performance.  
Research simply cannot tell us how much money to spend on teachers to produce a given 
outcome for students.   
 If courts are predisposed to intervene on this matter, the most reasonable standard for 
“adequacy” would be whether resources available to a district are adequate to meet 
current regulatory standards.  In this regard, I would make two provisos.  First, the 
standard should require that districts spend money efficiently.   A district that insists it 
must raise the pay of all teachers in the district because it cannot recruit a certified speech 
pathologist is not spending money wisely.  Second, state licensing standards must have 
some flexibility.  As noted above, the large number of certifications and endorsements 
guarantees that virtually no district can assure that every class will be taught by a teacher 
with the right certificate and endorsement.  Indeed, most of the “out of field” teaching in 
public schools would disappear overnight if states issued a single license in K-12 
teaching as they do in medicine, law, accounting, and other professions.  Short of that, 
aggressive development of “alternative route” licensing programs that target existing 
vacancies hold considerable promise.  Teachers in some small rural schools cannot be 
licensed in every field in which their teaching skills are required.  Here, too, licensing 
standards must have some flex. 
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 Finally, let me conclude by saying that I have focused on the general level of teacher 
pay.   I find little convincing evidence of general underpayment of teachers, although 
with 14,000 school districts in the U.S. there are no doubt some where that case can be 
made.  However, a more compelling argument is that some teachers are underpaid.  The 
problem with teacher pay in traditional public schools is not its overall level, but its rigid 
structure.  Relative pay increases may be in order for some particularly valuable  teachers 
(and relative pay declines for others).  In large urban school districts rigid salary 
schedules cover hundreds of schools and thousands of teachers.  These schedules reward 
teacher characteristics with little demonstrated relationship to performance and suppress 
differentials for teacher characteristics that may really matter (e.g, high levels of 
performance, willingness to teach in low performing schools, scarce field skills).   A 
much more productive discussion concerning teacher pay would focus on its inefficient 
structure and the benefits of a more market and performance-based system. 
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